The Game Theory Analysis of the Choice of Honest Conducts between Enterprises

WU Xue-hua

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The Game Theory Analysis of the Choice of Honest Conducts between Enterprises

更新时间：2022-01-07

- The Game Theory Analysis of the Choice of Honest Conducts between Enterprises
- Journal of University of Jinan(Social Science Edition) Issue 5, Pages: 60-63(2003)
- 作者机构：
  
  济南大学经济学院,山东,济南,250002
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
- DOI：
  CLC： F270
- Published：2003，
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[1]吴学花.监督机构监督力度与企业诚信度关系分析[J].济南大学学报(社会科学版),2003,{4}(05):60-63+93.

WU Xue-hua. The Game Theory Analysis of the Choice of Honest Conducts between Enterprises. [J]. Journal of University of Jinan(Social Science Edition) (5):60-63(2003)
[1]吴学花.监督机构监督力度与企业诚信度关系分析[J].济南大学学报(社会科学版),2003,{4}(05):60-63+93. DOI：

WU Xue-hua. The Game Theory Analysis of the Choice of Honest Conducts between Enterprises. [J]. Journal of University of Jinan(Social Science Edition) (5):60-63(2003) DOI：

摘要

如果市场不存在监督

企业间交易的博奕均衡是相互欺诈;如果存在完全有效的监督

企业的博奕均衡是相互诚信。要实现有效监督在于监督机构与企业之间的博奕。分析结果表明企业交易的预期利润率越低

监督机构的监督力度越低

对企业欺诈的处罚力度越低

企业越倾向于欺诈。因此

监督力度必须随企业交易数额的扩大、交易利润率的降低而增强

同时应对企业欺诈行为进行更为严厉的处罚。市场经济是诚信经济

企业应牢记"诚信金不换"的信条。

Abstract

Enterprises will deceit each other if there is no supervision

otherwise

they will be honest to each other if there is completely effective supervision. The effectiveness of supervision depends on the game between supervisors and enterprises. Enterprises tend to deceit in trade if the expect profit rate

the strength of supervision and penalty are low. In conclusion

Supervision should be strengthened along with the drop of the rate of profit and the increase of trade quantity. Reinforcing the strength of penalty is a important way to realize the honest economy.

关键词

诚信欺诈博奕监督

Keywords

诚信欺诈博奕监督

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