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XU Wei, FENG Wenfang, WU Yue:Is Incentive Mechanism for Key People in State-owned Enterprises Beneficial to Exploratory Innovation in the Mixed Ownership Reform?

发布者:学报编辑部 [发表时间]:2021-05-15 [来源]:济南大学学报(社会科学版)编辑部 [浏览次数]:

    How to build a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote exploratory innovation in state-owned enterprises in the mixed ownership reform? This is a hot issue of public concern demanded by the national innovation-driven development strategy. This paper studies state-owned companies listed between 2012 and 2018, and investigates the logical relationship between the salary and equity incentive for key people in these companies, i.e., chairman and general manager and exploratory innovation. From the perspective of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, this paper compares and analyzes the particularity of the influence of incentive mechanism for key people in state-owned enterprises undergoing profound mixed ownership reform on exploratory innovation. From the perspective of classified governance of state-owned enterprises, this paper further analyzes differences in the influence of incentive mechanism for key people in state-owned enterprises with different functions and different factor densities on exploratory innovation. The results show that: (1) At present, salary incentive for the chairman of state-owned enterprises significantly affects the output of exploratory innovation of state-owned enterprises, and equity incentive for the general manager is beneficial to promote the output of exploratory innovation; (2) Compared with general state-owned enterprises, salary incentive for the chairman of state-owned enterprises undergoing profound mixed ownership reform can significantly promote exploratory innovation, while the effect of salary incentive for the general manager is not significant, but equity incentive for the general manager can significantly promote exploratory innovation; (3) Compared with high-tech enterprises, salary incentive for the chairman of non-high-tech enterprises has a restraining effect on exploratory innovation activities, while the effect of salary incentive for the general manager is still not significant; however, compared with non-high-tech enterprises, equity incentive for the general manager of high-tech enterprises can significantly promote exploratory innovation.


【原文链接】徐伟  冯文芳  吴悦:《混改背景下国企关键人激励机制有利于探索式创新吗?》发表于《济南大学学报》(社会科学版)2021年第3期