At the same time of introducing non-state-owned capital, how to build a reasonable ownership structure to encourage enterprises to obtain innovation competitiveness? This is the core issue that both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are most concerned about. This paper takes the state-owned listed companies with mixed ownership reform in 2009-2018 as the research object, uses the power of the board of directors owned by non-state-owned shareholders as an alternative variable to play the governance effect, uses the method of propensity score matching analysis to test the logical relationship between mixed ownership reform and innovation efficiency, and further analyzes the effect of mixed reform of different functional state-owned enterprises from the perspective of Classified Governance of state-owned enterprises. The results show that: strengthening the mixed ownership reform of non-state-owned shareholders’ right to speak is conducive to promoting the innovation input and the output of exploratory innovation of state-owned enterprises. Secondly Compared with the specific functional enterprises, the reform of mixed ownership, that is, giving non-state-owned shareholders the right to speak, has a more significant impact on the innovation activities of general commercial state-owned enterprises.