Is Incentive Mechanism for Key People in State-owned Enterprises Beneficial to Exploratory Innovation in the Mixed Ownership Reform?
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Is Incentive Mechanism for Key People in State-owned Enterprises Beneficial to Exploratory Innovation in the Mixed Ownership Reform?
JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITY OF JINAN (Social Science Edition)Vol. 31, Issue 3, Pages: 96-110(2021)
作者机构:
济南大学 商学院,山东 济南 250002
作者简介:
基金信息:
DOI:
CLC:F276.44; F273.1
Published:15 May 2021,
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Wei XU, Wenfang FENG, Yue WU. Is Incentive Mechanism for Key People in State-owned Enterprises Beneficial to Exploratory Innovation in the Mixed Ownership Reform?. [J]. JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITY OF JINAN (Social Science Edition) 31(3):96-110(2021)
DOI:
Wei XU, Wenfang FENG, Yue WU. Is Incentive Mechanism for Key People in State-owned Enterprises Beneficial to Exploratory Innovation in the Mixed Ownership Reform?. [J]. JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITY OF JINAN (Social Science Edition) 31(3):96-110(2021)DOI:
Is Incentive Mechanism for Key People in State-owned Enterprises Beneficial to Exploratory Innovation in the Mixed Ownership Reform?
How to build a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote exploratory innovation in state-owned enterprises in the mixed ownership reform? This is a hot issue of public concern demanded by the national innovation-driven development strategy. This paper studies state-owned companies listed between 2012 and 2018
and investigates the logical relationship between the salary and equity incentive for key people in these companies
i.e.
chairman and general manager and exploratory innovation. From the perspective of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises
this paper compares and analyzes the particularity of the influence of incentive mechanism for key people in state-owned enterprises undergoing profound mixed ownership reform on exploratory innovation. From the perspective of classified governance of state-owned enterprises
this paper further analyzes differences in the influence of incentive mechanism for key people in state-owned enterprises with different functions and different factor densities on exploratory innovation. The results show that: (1) At present
salary incentive for the chairman of state-owned enterprises significantly affects the output of exploratory innovation of state-owned enterprises
and equity incentive for the general manager is beneficial to promote the output of exploratory innovation; (2) Compared with general state-owned enterprises
salary incentive for the chairman of state-owned enterprises undergoing profound mixed ownership reform can significantly promote exploratory innovation
while the effect of salary incentive for the general manager is not significant
but equity incentive for the general manager can significantly promote exploratory innovation; (3) Compared with high-tech enterprises
salary incentive for the chairman of non-high-tech enterprises has a restraining effect on exploratory innovation activities
while the effect of salary incentive for the general manager is still not significant; however
compared with non-high-tech enterprises
equity incentive for the general manager of high-tech enterprises can significantly promote exploratory innovation.